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Situated Critiques of Intervention:  
Mozambique and the Diverse Politics of Response 
Meera Sabaratnam 
 “I belong irreducibly to my time.” 
- Fanon 
Introduction 
For those investigating the state of international relations today, there can be few 
more valuable sites of study than the practice of statebuilding interventions around the 
world. It is at these points where, away from the formal niceties of the diplomatic circus, the 
political, economic, social and sometimes military forces of the so-called Great Powers rub 
up against both each other and those of the global South, under conditions of seemingly 
relative permissiveness and invisibility from the eyes of the Northern media. To see and 
understand the lived nature of the global state of affairs, then, one might be better advised to 
visit Kigali or Phnom Penh than Washington or Brussels. The contemporary debate about 
statebuilding interventions and the liberal peace should therefore not be considered as a 
niche interest within the discipline of IR or peace studies; rather it is constitutive of the 
major problematics that have concerned theorists of all hues for decades: hegemony, 
globalisation, empire, sovereignty, human rights and so on.  
A number of critical theorists within the discipline have rightly latched onto this 
thought, and have developed analyses that mobilise different theoretical perspectives to 
frame the problematic. A global critique has developed around the notions of statebuilding 
interventions as an international ‘neo-imperial’ ‘liberal peace’ or ‘neoliberal governance’ that 
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is characterised principally by its intentions to spread Western ideologies and capitalism in 
the non-West.  Many of these critiques are majorly influenced by Foucault’s work on 
discourse as the association of knowledge and power, his notion of biopolitics, by the 
Gramscian concept of hegemony, or indeed both plus others.  The application of these 
streams of thought to the question of statebuilding has been extremely valuable in opening 
up different theoretical, political and ethical questions around the practice, and indeed has 
reinvigorated critical theory itself within the discipline.  
Yet, as Hobson notes, it is not impossible for critical theory to reinforce a 
Eurocentrism in thought that through a monological account of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the 
international system (2007). I argue that this has also happened, with qualifications, in the 
realm of critical theories of the liberal peace, and is compounded by a fairly consistent, if 
apologetic, division of the world into ‘liberal / neoliberal’ and ‘local / non-liberal / 
traditional’ halves that are characterised by adherence to particular ideologies and 
knowledge structures, plus a general pessimism about the preponderance of the former. As 
a potentially emancipatory project, this tendency is disturbing on a number of levels, not 
least including the frequent omission, downgrading or ignoring of the substance of politics 
at the sites of supposed domination that might themselves be the basis of an alternative 
politics of interaction. Furthermore, it seems to accept at face value the account of the extent 
of the liberal transformation of post-conflict societies. 
This chapter proposes an alternative way of exploring a case of intervention that is 
inspired by anticolonial critiques of empire, which builds on and challenges a number of the 
insights of critical analysis thus far. It does this through a situated exploration of the politics 
of intervention in Mozambique, based in fieldwork techniques that attempt to capture 
observations and responses to intervention as seen by various actors both involved and not 
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involved in the process.  It argues these situated, embedded aspects can help the study of 
international politics by going beyond the problematic of alterity employed in current 
framings and into distinct concrete political questions in the relationship.  
I. Critiques of the (neo)liberal peace 
Critical theorists working on the question of how international agencies intervene in 
post-conflict spaces have largely been concerned to develop a more or less global picture of a 
system driven by a particular logic or logics to exert a particular universalising 
transformative effect at different sites of intervention. The existing critical literature does this 
through three related analytic moves. The first is the expansion of the notion of liberalism 
through attaching the label ‘liberal’ to a broad set of contemporary intervention activities, 
which implies a structural relationship between these activities in that they have roots in 
liberalism. A second aspect of this has been the association of this ‘liberal’ ideology with 
agencies, organisations and actors coming from ‘the West’.  The third face of this is the 
understanding of this relationship between through the lens or metaphor of ‘imperialism’.  
Together these three angles – the ideas of liberalism, the agency of the West and the 
structure of imperialism as the analogy for the relationship – form the foundation of a 
powerful, insightful and productive critique of ‘the liberal peace’.i The literature on this is 
extremely rich in terms of commentary, detail and observation. However, as I will argue, the 
mode of theorising and research is also limiting in terms of being critical theory, that engages 
and articulates alternative ways of thinking and envisions dimensions of change; in short, 
the “formulaic, top-down and ethnocentric” (Mac Ginty 2007: 457) nature of the liberal peace 
finds some parallels in the analytical framing of its critiques. The next section looks at these 
features of the existing critique.   
a. The preponderance of the ‘liberal’ as global formula and narrative 
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As articulated by Mac Ginty and Richmond, the liberal peace “represents an 
increasingly formulaic synthesis of Western-style democratisation, “good governance”, 
human rights, the rule of law, and developed, open markets” that become the hallmarks of 
post-conflict intervention (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007: 491). A key claim of much of this 
critique is that the liberal peace is “the new ideology, upon which life, culture, society, 
prosperity and politics are assumed to rest” (2007: 493, emphasis added).  The ‘liberal peace’ 
for Richmond is an expansive, and perhaps all-encompassing, characterisation of post-
conflict interventions. It can be broken down into gradations, which can be 
conservative/realist, orthodox or emancipatory in nature, depending on which discourse of 
liberal peace is most favoured from the four strands that comprise it (Richmond 2005). 
Despite the multiplicity of components and emphases that the discourses and practices of 
post-war interventions can have, which Richmond himself acknowledges can be 
“theoretically rather incoherent” (Richmond 2008: 15), the central motif of the work is that it 
can be usefully understood as the ‘liberal peace project’ – a “blueprint for stability and 
sustainability” (Richmond and Franks 2007: 44) adhered to by peacebuilders across the 
spectrum. This includes military interventions that focus on the ‘conservative’ aspects of a 
liberal peace as well as NGOs that envision an ‘emancipatory’ version of the liberal peace.  
Duffield’s critique of contemporary post-war and developmental intervention makes 
much bolder claims about the role of liberalism now and historically, seeing it as 
fundamentally shaping both security and development, and therefore relations between 
North and South. Adapting Foucault’s application of the notion of ‘biopolitics’ to the Third 
World, Duffield argues that “[l]iberalism is a technology of governance that supports 
freedom while governing people through the interconnected natural, social, and economic 
processes that together sustain life” (2007:6). In its contemporary guise, it supports the 
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joining of development and security discourses to secure a form of liberal governance that is 
modernity’s solution to the problem of the ‘surplus’ life required and produced by 
capitalism (10). As such, a rethinking of “whether liberalism itself, rather than being seen as 
a solution, is counted as one of the problems” is required in order to improve the situation 
(31).  
Whilst, of course, some form of simplification is a legitimate course of action for any 
theorist of the international system to take, what emerges from all of these critiques, 
individually and as a whole, is that an expansive, inclusive ideological programme 
identified as ‘the liberal peace’, ‘liberalism’ and/or ‘neoliberalism’ is the key feature of 
intervention in the South by international agencies. This creates the narratives of a single 
hegemonic interventionary framework that is ideologically unitary, if not coherent, and 
intentionally driven according to this ideology.   
b. The ideology-origin problematic, cultural inappropriateness and ‘hybridity’ 
With different degrees of qualification and variegation, the tendency in the critical 
literature is to associate this ideology very generically with ‘the West’, and to disassociate it 
from the spaces of intervention, where ‘traditional’ or ‘local’ values are narrated as opposed 
to those of liberal political structures.  This consciousness underpins a number of critiques of 
the liberal peace, which highlight the incompleteness or ineffectiveness of trying to impose 
an alien system on another society. 
The notion of ‘hybridity’ has, however, emerged as an assessment of the results of 
liberal peacebuilding, whereby ‘indigenous’ or ‘local’ actors have combined and/or adapted 
post-conflict institutions to fit other ‘traditional’ patterns of legitimation. For example, in his 
discussion of Cambodia’s statebuilding project, Roberts notes that various political 
structures and processes, such as the Senate and land reform were ‘indigenized’, 
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representing a continuation of traditional forms of rule and politics within the statebuilding 
experience (2009: 165). Roberts sees the Cambodian case being one where statebuilding had 
“a superficial impact on very resilient indigenous societies and polities” (163), but argues 
that essentially this may have been a good thing from the point of view of being both 
“culturally appropriate [and] pragmatically necessary” (167). Whilst Roberts recognises the 
inherent dangers of ‘Othering’ other states by normalising ‘liberal democracy’, it is clear that 
there is a basic division that underpins the argument between the ‘indigenous’ and the 
‘democratic’.  
Other theorists have grappled with the problematic also, warning against the 
dangers of romanticising or essentialising the ‘local’ (Richmond 2009a), but do not dispense 
with it as the key distinction within analysis. Richmond, in a discussion visualising a ‘post-
liberal peace’ argues that  
 “A research agenda is needed which engages with an understanding 
of the dynamics of the relationship between the liberal and the local, and of 
the interface between the two in terms of everyday life for local communities 
and actors, as well as for more abstract institutional frameworks. This 
‘liberal-local interface’, and the nature of peace that it suggests requires 
extensive and ongoing consultation and research in order to develop these 
ideas” (2009b: emphasis added).  
One of the questions that is being identified here is that of the diverse origins of 
interveners and recipients as leading to a basic alienation from the ideas of intervention on 
the part of the latter. The implication is that statebuilding / the liberal peace needs to find a 
way of developing a type of meeting point between the liberal and the local depends on the 
claim that they are basically different.ii  As Chandler (this volume) argues, the 
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problematisation of alterity underpins both the power-based critiques of liberal peace such 
as these, as well as the more technocratic approaches that seek to limit the liberal nature of 
the practices.  
The limits of global critique 
Whilst both interesting and powerful, many contemporary critiques of intervention 
remain distant from the sites of intended ‘emancipation’ – that is the ‘recipients’ or objects of 
domination, hegemony and empire. I do not mean this in a physical or geographical sense – 
increasingly fieldwork and familiarity with context and cases is becoming better used within 
the literature – but in an unwillingness to attempt the use of other embedded 
epistemological standpoints to act as a counterpoint, understood in a Saidian sense, to the 
dominant narrative of global ‘liberalism’ or ‘neoliberalism’, rather than purely re-inscribing 
its force through a critique from a similar viewpoint (Chowdry 2007: 101).  The narrative of a 
liberal-imperial-West as the principal intervener in the Third World, shaping it into a 
formulaic liberal image through its actions is the principal thrust of much current critique. 
Whilst plausible and useful in a general sense, I argue that this formulation itself, if 
interrogated more deeply, also becomes problematic at precisely the site of attempting to 
engage with the ‘local’ or ‘indigenous’, which is constructed as the opposite of the ‘liberal’.iii  
It must firstly be noted that the label ‘liberal’ is used so variously throughout and 
within the critical literature and used interchangeably with ‘neoliberal’, that it is hard to 
argue that it has a consistent meaning. In Richmond’s formulation, the ‘liberal’ peace is also 
a hybrid of different strands, including militarism, orthodox conservatism and emancipatory 
politics. In short, ‘liberalism’ becomes a breadth of different political positions and activities 
that characterise interventions by a broad group of actors. This is perhaps a formally valid 
move in the sense that between political philosophers, there are deep divisions as to what 
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constitutes ‘liberalism’ and who its true heirs are, as well as political differences between the 
values of polities that are thought to have ‘liberal’ foundations.  
However, given the way that it is used, and particularly when it is used as a quality 
distinct from the ‘local’ or the ‘non-Western’, it seems clear that it denotes a marker of origin 
as much as a marker of political philosophy. As such, the West is narrated as liberal, and 
liberal ideas are narrated as Western.  This is also the case in Duffield, whose account of 
liberalism strongly ties it to Western domination and imperialism as a technology of 
government.  What he means is that liberalism is a set of ideas and beliefs that has been used 
to exercise and legitimate control over various parts of the non-Western world.  
Such accounts of liberalism draw a boundary of an ideology-power-origin 
problematic of the liberal peace, that is for Richmond overcome through a pluralist Eirenism 
that demonstrates ‘empathy’ for the ‘local’ (2009b). Such a formulation is intended to respect 
difference and not erase it, as has supposedly been the tendency of the liberal peace. 
However, the conception of ‘difference’ is one that seems to rest on the liberal-local binary, 
which, despite the various deconstructions that the critiques of the liberal peace do, is not 
one which is subjected to sufficient scrutiny. Whilst ‘othering’ is challenged in the discourses 
of intervention, it is not fundamentally challenged within the critiques themselves, which 
seek to reconstruct the structural impasse, albeit in a more emancipated way.  This 
construction also reflects either epistemological humility or epistemological scepticism, or 
both, when it comes to analysing, narrating or ‘knowing’ the post-conflict environment and 
people that live within it. As such, there is usually a deferral against articulating anything 
more specific than either the origin of people (‘local’ / ‘indigenous’), although this 
sometimes also becomes ‘non-liberal’ or ‘non-Western’.  
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The risks of such a ‘solution’ to the ‘liberal peace’ become clearer when trying to 
actually execute the principles of engaging ‘the everyday’ empathetically. What emerges is 
that the ethical and political problems of ‘liberal’ interventions are not in and of themselves 
a clash with the ‘local’ or the ‘indigenous’ as abstract or concrete forms. In many formerly 
colonial states, the meaningfulness of the ‘local’ or ‘indigenous’ is as problematic as the 
meaning of the ‘liberal’ is amongst the interveners. Indeed, the Todorovian Encounter that 
seems to haunt critical engagement with today’s global South feels misplaced.  But if critique 
remains in a principally abstract form, it seems inevitable that it will reproduce these 
categories. A related critique might be made of Duffield’s appeal to the notion of ‘the 
governed’ which underpins his appeal for a ‘practical politics of solidarity’ (2007). Whilst he 
is keen to focus on the similarities between people rather than the differences, the very 
broad level of his critique – entirely directed at the ideas underpinning liberalism and 
development – does not permit him to go there in any substantive way. As such the 
meaning of ‘the governed’ as a class of peoples amongst which solidarity might be 
constructed seems to dissipate in context.   
II. Situated revolt: intellectual inversion, immanent critique and creativity in anti-colonial 
protest 
When thinking about whether the liberal peace is imperial – a term frequently used 
in the critiques – it is worth remembering that historically many anti-imperial thinkers and 
activists did not focus their intellectual attacks on imperialism and colonialism as a European 
or liberal ideology per se. They certainly made trenchant critiques of imperial and capitalist 
economic exploitation, and attacked the racist foundations of rule.iv However, in many cases 
this was not so much derived from the principles of an underlying fundamental alterity or 
‘local’ character as the differentiated, violent and unjust experience of life under colonial rule. 
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Intellectually and politically, it was articulated strongly in terms of universalist and 
immanent critiques of the existing order, around which solidarist and internationalist 
political coalitions were formed (Jones 2010).   
As such, the relevant response to the question of empire was a forceful concretisation 
and articulation of its problematic effects. Beyond structural economic analysis, thinkers 
identified and described a range of problems, including racism, dispossession, psychological 
control and violence of many forms, through seeking to engage the experiences of the 
colonised. It was this situated critique of the experience of empire that undermined its claims 
to being a ‘civilising’ influence; what became nakedly apparent was that it was a system of 
violence, exploitation and instrumentalisation despite its own propaganda.  
Indeed, an important part of this critique of colonialism was their failure to extend 
the application of universal rights to peoples under their rule: 
 “And that is the great thing I hold against pseudo-humanism: that for too 
long it has diminished the rights of man, that its concept of those rights has been 
– and still is – narrow and fragmentary, incomplete and biased and, all things 
considered, sordidly racist…that at the very time when it most often mouths the 
word, the West has never been further from being able to live a true humanism – 
a humanism made to the measure of the world.” (Cesaire 1972, emphasis in the 
original) 
Cesaire’s critique is stinging because it turns ideas about domination back on their 
proponents as a means of critique. This suggests that an immanent critiquev of ‘European’ 
ways could be a sincere, provocative and useful way to engage others on common political 
terrain. The major themes then become about deliberate exclusion from these processes, and 
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a denial of the humanity of the colonised as a basis for a much more ambitious pan-African 
vision. This is expressed neatly in Cabral’s public declaration against the Portuguese:  
 “The African anticolonialist organisations of the Portuguese colonies 
representing the legitimate aspirations of their people want to re-establish the 
human dignity of Africans, their freedom, and the right to determine their own 
future. These organisations want the people to enjoy real social development 
based on fruitful work and economic progress, on African unity and fraternity, 
on friendship and equality with all peoples, including the Portuguese people. 
They want peace in the service of humanity.” (Cabral 1981: 27) 
Indeed, the early post-colonial thinkers acknowledged their various intellectual debts 
to the West, even as they sought to subvert or expand the frameworks with which they 
worked, the better to capture what they understood as their realities (Chabal 1981). Their 
move then becomes not purely an ‘ontological’ one in the pitting of the rational individual 
against the forces of production or race, but also a positional one to do with the standpoint 
from which problems are viewed and the experiences in which they are embedded.  
This is not to say that these thinkers necessarily validated the universalist discourses 
which legitimated empire, nor that there were no important differences between them and 
the universalisms of the anti-colonial movement. The point is that they understood 
universals as embedded in and productive of a particular kind of politics, and re-thought 
them accordingly. Simply because forms of power validate themselves in universalist and 
exceptionalist terms does not mean that they are what they say, nor that successfully 
opposing them requires a fixation on their imagined opposite. Rather, it might also involve a 
subversion and redeployment of these ideas to express an alternative idea of politics in a 
creative manner. 
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So far, critiques of the liberal peace have not tended to recognise this,vi although 
given the politics of inclusion they demand (e.g. ‘a practical politics based on the solidarity 
of the governed’ for Duffield) it is clear that such work might usefully complement, help re-
think and re-articulate the core problematic of international power in post-war 
environments. In what follows, I will briefly illustrate the potential of this alternative critical 
project through an engagement with the recent politics of the ‘liberal peace’ in Mozambique.  
III. Exploring the case of Mozambique and the ‘liberal peace’ 
Mozambique, whilst often put forward as an example of a ‘success story’ within both 
the peacebuilding and development literature, is also put forward as a case of a ‘governance 
state’, as discussed by Graham Harrison (2005). Since 1990, and slightly beforehand, it has 
been subject to large quantities of targeted international intervention and assistance in the 
name of peacebuilding, governance assistance, capacity building and democratisation, 
which have sought to transform it away from being a socialist one-party state towards a 
multi-party democracy. As a example selected to develop a critique of the liberal peace, 
then, I argue that it represents a important case – one where the intervention of the 
international community has coincided with the cessation of violent conflict, the holding of 
regular elections, the rebuilding of state institutions, impressive rates of economic growth 
and macroeconomic stabilisation, an increase in the numbers and sizes of civil society 
organisations, the attraction of foreign investment, the awarding of a ‘good governance’ 
prize to its former President, a sizeable fall in the level of absolute poverty and so on.  It 
regularly gets cited within policy documents as a representation of precisely what can be 
achieved through the correct type of engagement (Hanlon and Smart 2008: 5).  
Interestingly, neither the critics nor supporters of the liberal peace have engaged 
with it very extensively within the literature as evidence for their various positions, 
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although there is a growing literature rooted in development and anthropology that deals 
with Mozambique’s trajectory over time. The exceptions to this are Mark Duffield’s work on 
the role of NGOs (2007), which extends his account of global liberal governance, Michel 
Cahen’s assessment of success in the Making States Work volume (2005), Roland Paris’s 
analysis in At War’s End (2004: 135-148) and its inclusion in a new study in this volume (see 
Zuercher).  Duffield shows that NGOs have become part of the governmental process in 
Northern Mozambique. Cahen, asked to provide an analysis of Mozambique’s success for 
the volume, argues for an only qualified success with regard to societal involvement, and 
Paris argues that given the shallow domestic roots of the war, it does not provide a basis for 
assessing the outcomes of liberal peacebuilding, although it can be considered largely 
successful.  
 
What remains unexplored within the literature on this subject, with a slight 
exception to the work of Cahen, a sociologist, are the internal processes and politics of 
Mozambique as they relate to intervention. Within broader debates about development and 
intervention, as well as emanating from within policy organs themselves, there is a much 
richer literature on what has happened over the last twenty years, although again, the 
majority of this is framed by the objectives of interveners or by other particular debates. 
Work that deals with the ethics and politics of intervention in Mozambique, with a few 
notable exceptionsvii, is neither sought after nor produced with much frequency.  
The rest of this chapter will sketch briefly some selected political critiques made 
within Mozambique of co-operation with the West, which uses the critical interpretation of 
the ‘liberal peace’ as a set of pervasive social transformations. These viewpoints are drawn 
from various forms of primary and secondary research collected within and outside 
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Mozambique on the subject of internationally-sponsored reform and transformation. These 
critiques are selected, interpreted and articulated by the author in terms of insights they 
shed on the liberal peace debate in terms of concretising issues. As such, there is no claim 
being made that these are statistically representative nor that they in any way exhaust the 
range of critiques of intervention that are made within Mozambique by various groups. 
Indeed, given the practical and political problems of reliable access to non-elite and non-
urban sources of critique, , these are somewhat skewed towards urban and elite critiques. 
This is a general limitation of the narrative. Nonetheless, they attempt to shed some light on 
the dynamics of intervention as experienced and understood by its supposed non-liberal 
Others. As I will argue in the conclusion, these preoccupations suggest a rather different 
approach to the politics of critical engagement than that hitherto displayed in the debate on 
the liberal peace. In this sense, the case material is not intended as an ethnographic 
treatment of the ‘everyday’, as advocated by Richmond, which I have suggested reproduces 
discourses of Otherness within critique.  In offering these specific critiques as important on 
their own terms, the paper seeks to challenge more radically the normal hierarchies of 
critique between scholars and subjects. 
IV. Situating critiques in Mozambique 
a. Problematising economic neoliberalism 
Critiques of the liberal peace suggest that liberal ideology is a key aspect of 
intervention in the South, and that this is problematic for ‘local’ communities, whose values 
are not incorporated (see Richmond, this volume).  However, in interpreting responses in 
Mozambique about the various forms of intervention in the country and the associated 
relationships with aid partners, there were rarely objections articulated to the ideological 
principles behind programmes based on ‘local’ values, even from those who were most 
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exercised about the system as it currently stood. This is not to suggest that there are not 
distinctive traditions of politics across Mozambique, but it does indicate that it is not their 
disruption that informs primary objections to intervention.  
More commonly, particular principles associated with ‘liberal’ policy discourses 
were often selectively redeployed to critique the impact of neoliberal development, which 
had resulted in deep economic vulnerability. There was a consciousness amongst those that 
worked in the policy levels in the agricultural sector and more widely that the international 
financial institutions were conscious that they had been proved wrong over their choices for 
the cashew industry, errors which stemmed from arrogance and heavy-handedness as much 
as from policy failure.viii Those very few that did talk self-consciously about the turn towards 
capitalism in the late 1980s presented it as an expediency above all else for getting foreign 
assistance,ix although not one to which there were sustained objections. 
The more prevalent and cutting objections towards the economic reform agenda was 
that it did not either reflect any historical pattern of development, nor was it fair in how it 
was set up: 
But economic activity must be public before it is private. If you look at the 
USA in the 30s, the EU until today – they are giving subsidies, they have the 
biggest force in innovation and technology, in product quality. So Mozambique, 
if it follows the rules, couldn’t compete. So we were still poor, because we didn’t 
make the rules.x 
The critique here of neoliberal economics is much more blunt than it being 
inappropriate or incomprehensible – it is that it is a basically false model for development. 
The same was echoed in discussions with low-income farmers in rural Nampula, who 
wanted “above all, markets” for their crops, but despite reforms lacked access to ones in 
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which they could compete.xi In both cases, it is the promises of free markets and 
development which are turned against the actual effects of reform.  
Visible public anger of recent years has focused on discontent with rising food and 
fuel prices, which have in the last three years resulted in unprecedented political riots and a 
restoration of the subsidies that donors had encourage the government to remove. Within 
the context of these riots have been articulated resentment of visibly rising inequalities and 
widespread unemployment, for which the extravagant wealth of the political elite has 
become a focal point.xii  
What is of note for the liberal peace debate is that it is policies themselves that are 
being contested politically, for their incoherence and failure to generate the promised well-
being. In the case of the price riots at least it is clear that anger is directed towards 
Mozambican political and business elites much more so than the general presence of 
international intervention, although the specific role of international financial institutions is 
noted by some. Importantly, though, the axes of critique – unfairness, inequality, hypocrisy 
– are not the assertions of a fundamental alterity but appeals to values associated with 
universal relevance.  
b. International assistance and the suppression of politics  
This is not to say that value is not placed on any form of pluralism. Indeed, an 
important charge levelled against the various forms of international assistance is that it has 
stifled the political creativity and imagination of elites and blunted their capacity for 
critique. For example, the director of a civil society organisation focused on accountability 
and good governance, itself funded by the UK government argued:  
 “There is no alternative there – they don’t do ideology; they just do what 
the donors want. Co-operation has really corrupted the thinking of African 
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leaders. They know that they can lose their jobs and consultancies if they are too 
critical. There are two forces contributing to this – the state: people want an easy 
life, and the donors.”xiii 
Another argued that: 
 “Development needs to be less dependent. If Mozambique accepted this, 
there would be room to think. But there is not a debate at the moment. There is 
lots of accommodation… we need to think about depending less.”xiv 
From these and other commentaries it is clear that a major area of concern was that 
the perception that donor assistance monopolised the economic, and subsequently political, 
concerns of ruling elites. From the perspective of government insiders, this situation was not 
denied but framed as the necessary pragmatism of a poor country – indeed a historic 
pragmatism that had formed part of the Frelimo political tradition since its pre-
Independence struggle. As is now publicly commemorated as part of Frelimo folklore, 
during the Cold War, Frelimo leader Eduardo Mondlane famously received money from the 
US, Soviet and Chinese governments to fund the anti-colonial war.  The receipt of money 
from a wide range of donors in the present day was justified in similar terms.xv  
Critical political economy approaches to development and aid have often framed this 
situation as the co-optation of Southern elites through the development of their ability to 
profit from the proposed reforms. Indeed, this correlates with other accounts in this book of 
the actual impact of particular forms of transformation (see Hameiri, this volume). Indeed, 
as these critiques demonstrate, it is a conscious interpretation that is made within 
Mozambique itself of the behaviour of ruling elites. What is interesting however is that these 
critiques are made by actors who themselves use the discourses of donors – such as good 
governance and ownership – to develop force for their own political messages which are 
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critiques of vested power. This is not to claim that therefore these discourses are necessarily 
emancipatory – it is to point out that they can be and are subverted and redeployed to 
challenge power as well as maintain it. Critiques of the liberal peace, through an emphasis 
on the formulaic, liberal character of the discourses nonetheless miss the ways in which they 
can be leveraged in the service of particular and pointed critique. 
c. Wastefulness and introspection 
From the perspective of those implementing projects associated with donor 
assistance, when discussing the nature of the intervention, the issue of ‘imposition’ did 
occasionally arise. Again, this was not articulated as because the substance of the ideas was 
not comprehensible to ‘locals’, but because donors wanted to call the shots and prioritise 
their own requirements. Another substantial issue was that of the waste of resources 
through the spending of money on things that were not needed, too expensive, and that 
these were not having any intended effect: 
One thing I feel is not really good; in general, and this is the point of view 
of the donors. As a Mozambican, I feel that the donors give money but want to 
control everything... Normally when MINAG [Ministry of Agriculture] develops 
some plan to do themselves, they say no, do outsourcing. But this means that 
you have to give money to the company – you can’t assume it’s a better service. 
But the donors are just happy to subcontract and for someone to do the job in 
name. But we had experience – we were doing outsourcing in Zambezia and 
Nampula; the donors say they are happy, but in the end, I’m not happy; the 
company don’t take responsibility like the DPA [Provincial Agricultural 
Directorate] or MINAG. This contract is signed by MINAG, but you know it’s 
not the decision – it’s an imposition. This is a big problem; we impose a lot of 
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things… but I don’t think this is a good way, and this is why MINAG do some 
things themselves. Because sometimes they have seen the opportunity to change, 
add, but the donors don’t want. I feel that donors don’t really want to reduce 
poverty. We started with PROAGRI [the common fund] in 1995. There were 
millions spent on consultant studies – four studies, but if you see how much is 
going to the farmer, it’s just 25% - I say why? Each donor wants to do the study, 
and to use the money of PROAGRI. And the amount of money they pay for the 
study is unacceptable. They always want the evaluation, and they contract out – 
and how much do they support? But the support for the farmers itself, they are 
not getting a lot. With one study, you can buy ten tractors, can really solve some 
problems. I am not saying that the study is not important, but you need to let 
them do what they want, let them direct.xvi   
The overwhelming critique within this narrative however is that intervention in this 
case was fundamentally and obviously disconnected, both from its own objectives – i.e. the 
improvement of governance and the reduction of poverty – and the recipients – in this case 
the rural poor. Instead, intervention was more focused on things that could be executed by 
the donors to their own specifications or around their own needs, particularly those of 
familiarisation and evaluation. More respondents highlighted the percentages of 
programme and project budgets that were either spent within institutions on salaries and 
living costs for international and domestic employees, and the very small percentage that 
reached the intended recipients.xvii Again, this seems very distant from the critique that 
‘Western liberal’ norms are not appropriate for ‘local’ populations, or that there is some 
necessary friction between them. It rather seems that there is a more fundamental lacuna in 
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that projects and programmes are not seen to actually use their money to do very much that 
has any impact in practice.  
A clear issue articulated by those who where the intended targets of programmes 
was that whilst extensive training in governance and capacity was offered and given by 
organisations, very little material was supplied to actually carry out the things that they had 
been trained to do, whatever the notions underpinning the programmes. Health activists, 
farmers and religious leaders each mentioned that they had received training (‘capacitação’) 
in various skills which they were meant to pass on to others or carry out, but they lacked 
basic transport such as bicycles to even reach the places where training had to take place.xviii 
Whilst they worked around this, either by using borrowed means, or undertaking lengthy 
journeys by foot, it seemed an odd discrepancy that so much could be spent on the front end 
of the programmes and so little at the back.  Overall, the sense was that whilst assistance 
might be generally welcome, it did not often do very much, its stated objectives being only 
loosely delivered, and its material focus being largely internal. These aspects of intervention 
are visible and obvious to those on the receiving end of it. Whilst this image of development 
has perhaps become something of a cliché, I would argue that it remains a constitutive 
aspect of the experience of intervention. 
In terms of implications for critical theory, it has seemed so far within discussions of 
the liberal peace that such issues of wastefulness, introvertedness and incomplete, reversible 
implementation are rather too banal and pedestrian to deal with at the structural level.  They 
operate so much as commonsense both for ‘recipients’ and those working within the system 
that trying to understand the politics of this seem overly obvious.  
In terms of critique, it does however point towards more distributive issues that 
fundamentally call into question the nature of intervention if it consistently fails to get near 
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its objectives through a tendency to absorb its own resources. Certainly, amongst quite a few 
people, such as the respondent above, this set of practices suggested that intervention was 
not about really reducing poverty but the donor circus, and thus generated a level of 
cynicism amongst them.  This seemed to be a much more obvious and widespread cause of 
alienation than the fact that practices or values of intervention were in some way ‘foreign’ to 
societies.  Viewed from this perspective, intervention practices can present themselves as a 
form of introspective consumption for those involved.  
d. Populism, control, nationalism and resistance; changes in the relationship 
Indeed, particular politicians have made a good deal of political capital out of 
demonstrably resisting the perceived cultures of time-wasting, high foreign earners and 
kickbacks that are popularly associated with international co-operation. The former Health 
Minister Paulo Ivo Garrido is one such figure. He was almost universally a figure who 
caused discomfort amongst both the donor community and some of his colleagues due to 
his extremely centralised managerial style and forceful personality. However, amongst a 
large proportion of non-elite respondents, he was something of a hero for preventing his 
staff from attending various seminars paid for by the international community, with their 
attendant per diems and catering, for seeming to clamp down on corruption in hospitals, 
and for performing unannounced visits which often resulted in the dismissal of staff caught 
not doing their jobs, for which former leader Samora Machel was approvingly remembered.  
That he is a qualified surgeon also seems to gain him much respect amongst the general 
public who tend to view him as someone who works hard, does not suffer laziness, knows 
what he is doing and who stands up for himself.xix  
An incident which occurred in 2009 seemed to demonstrate the ways in which 
intervention practices play in populist politics. The US Charge d’Affaires threatened to 
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withdraw a large amount of US aid, including in the health sector, if eleven US health 
workers were not cleared to work in the Embassy’s HIV/AIDS programme.xx Their visas, 
similarly to the visas of a large number of other international workers at the present time, 
were been processed extremely slowly and painstakingly, pending the production of 
original documentation from medical schools and so on. The Minister said publicly that the 
Government must be able to determine what kind of health workers they need – the issue 
quickly became one about control, US high-handedness and ‘attempted blackmail’.xxi A 
number of respondents raised this as an example of US arrogance, a hark back to colonial 
master-servant relations, the US trying to impose their will and so on.xxii This inspired a 
certain amount of indignation and resentment about imposition, and became a point for 
discussions of national control of the agenda. One respondent however, working for a US-
funded NGO, was keen to stipulate that there were no problems in relations, that the whole 
thing was a misunderstanding and that people didn’t know what they were talking about.xxiii  
The increasing perception that Mozambique had the power to say ‘no’ to large 
donors, even if only occasionally, was clearly something that interested a number of 
respondents, even those critical of the government.xxiv Particularly within the government, 
there was a sense that in recent years Mozambique had entered a new era of co-operation, 
whereby it developed its own plans, was in control of its own agenda and so forth. Even 
with the IFIs, small victories such as the allowing of some protection for the sugar industry 
demonstrate that the government is willing to push the limits of their apparent regulations, 
and, in the case of the national development bank, completely side-step them through co-
operation with another donor.xxv  
Of course, as is well documented, the impact of new co-operation initiatives with 
partners such as China, Brazil and India has given African governments more options in 
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terms of financing without political conditions, and this is not less true in Mozambique. In 
the context of the relations with Northern donors, a Government Minister interviewed 
argued: 
This is the major impact of Brazil, India, China… We don’t waste months 
or years negotiating. You say what you want; you do it now and the road is 
there. You see the results immediately. We want results, not processes. We do 
not want to waste time discussing conditionality. There is no interference. The 
EU and US say that China is not democratic, it doesn’t respect human rights, but 
that is not our business. What we want is the agreement and to fulfil it. If they 
keep their obligations, that is ok. We are not changing their internal policies – 
that is not our business. We will not ask Zimbabwe to change its policies – it’s 
their business. They will ask for something – here we will ask them to accept our 
constitution. This principle of non-interference with India and China is better. It 
is not because we are against human rights. But we understand that they have 
their own systems and intelligence. It is not our business. We wouldn’t go to the 
US, to try and change the face of A and B. We would never go to Europe and ask 
for a President to be taken to court. We are not the champions of democracy. But 
in our relationships with China, we say what we want.xxvi  
It is clear that politically, it is important to the government to try to assert control 
over its development and intervention agenda as far as possible. This type of resistance at is 
something which has played well with the public – current President Guebuza’s critique of 
Chissano’s laxity (deixa-andarismo) in dealing with donors and internal corruption seemed 
to be one with which people could identify, and one which gained momentum going into 
the 2004 and 2009 Presidential elections.   
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Once more, there seems to be a political value to public resistance at work in 
Mozambique in the relationship with partners than one might have expected from reading 
the critiques of statebuilding, as well as successful instances of agenda control.  However, it 
is important to note that this is not a resistance against all foreigners, or against 
interventions from the outside, or even of liberalism – what seemed to be important was the 
ability to negotiate and choose the types of intervention and the kind of relationship it has 
with partners. This indicates that there is a politics about the relationship between 
Mozambique and the outside world, but it is not one marked by rejectionist attitudes so 
much as the desire to control and choose the means of equitable engagement.  
V. Conclusions 
Whilst the global critiques of the liberal peace have opened up, quite rightly, a 
number of ethical and political questions that need addressing, I argue that their emphasis 
on the origins of ideas and practices, and the division between the liberal and the local 
fundamentally obscures the concrete politics of intervention, and in particular the counter-
claims and critiques being made by its intended objects. However, I argue that in beginning 
to move towards a situated critique of intervention, we engage in analysis that can be more 
politically challenging, policy relevant and more radical in terms of its calls for reform.  The 
situated critiques show that not only is there disconnect between theory and policy, but 
between both of these and the concrete issues raised through experience.   
Experience in this case suggests that there are the beginnings of immanent critiques 
of intervention taking place within sites of intervention whereby the claim that intervention 
consists of transformative practices which operate to improve the host state and society, are 
fundamentally dubious.  The emerging critiques made by the intended objects of aid in 
Mozambique - that assistance is often wasteful, ineffective, ill-informed, introspective, 
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illiberal, repetitive and capricious – are not just operational critiques regarding 
implementation from people that have been co-opted into a particular ideological system. I 
argue that they can also, and should be read as political critiques that reveal much about the 
nature of the experience of intervention.   
Given the material situation of a country like Mozambique, these critiques are not 
surprising. When one considers the complaint of waste, it is clear that this is the flip-side of a 
politics of survival – what seems to accompany the international community’s rhetoric of 
alleviating poverty for subsistence and survival is a practice of internally maximising 
resource consumption and self-protection, which also reinforces the instrumentalisation of 
the process and alienation from it amongst recipients. The popularity of seeming to assert 
control and strength over the co-operation process however also indicates the significance of 
a sense of autonomy and direction that is not reducible to output and material benefits. 
Fanon’s account of racialised existential angst and violence, and Cabral’s focus on the 
‘reality of the land’ expressed and animated an situated and ‘humanist’ response to the 
practices of colonialism that contributed to a wider consciousness of its problems. I argue 
that critical theories of intervention in IR can gain much by thinking in a similar way, in 
order to fully engage and understand the dysfunctionality or otherwise of the system. Such 
a focus can open up areas for contestation and debate that are currently hidden or ignored, 
such as the problems of insularity, hypocrisy, waste and resentment.  These issues in a sense 
more radically challenge the mythologies of liberal intervention through systematically 
undercutting its self-image as competent, efficient bringers of peace and development. It is 
through engaging these important aspects of intervention’s lived experience that critics 
might be best placed to realise Duffield’s ambition for a ‘practical politics of the solidarity of 
the governed’. 
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i For more detail, see chapter 1 of this volume, Sabaratnam, M. ‘A brief intellectual history of 
international conflict management, 1990-2010’ and the Introduction to this volume. 
ii Richmond grapples further with this problem in his chapter in this volume, as does Mac 
Ginty, but I would suggest that it may not be resolved. However it is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to engage with these frameworks in detail. 
iii A somewhat nuanced and complex exception is the work of Graham Harrison, who 
discusses the ‘embedding’ or internalisation of ‘neoliberal’ policy mechanisms in governance states 
(2005). 
iv See Fanon (1963) and Cabral (1981) as key examples.  
v By use of the term ‘immanent critique’ I do mean a critique based on analysing the 
contradictions within the current system, however, I do not mean to imply anything about its role as a 
dialectic in history.  
vi With a few exceptions, e.g. Heathershaw (2007).   
vii In terms of work published in English, the work of Joseph Hanlon in Mozambique spans 
several decades, and has been critically engaged with the problems of developmental intervention 
since its inception. See Hanlon (1984, 1990, 1996), Hanlon and Smart (2008).  
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